



Bibliography

Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical

- Anderson, J. 1983. *The Architecture of Cognition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Armstrong, D. 1968. *A Materialist Theory of Mind*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Armstrong, D. 1981. "What is consciousness?" In *The Nature of Mind*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Baars, B. 1988. *A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Balog, K. 1999. "Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem." *Philosophical Review*, 108: 497-528.
- Block, N. 1980a. "Troubles with Functionalism," in *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology*, Volume 1, Ned Block, ed., Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 268-305.
- Block, N. 1980b. "Are absent qualia impossible?" *Philosophical Review*, 89/2: 257-74.
- Block, N. 1990. "Inverted Earth," *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4, J. Tomberlin, ed., Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
- Block, N. 1995. "On a confusion about the function of consciousness." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 18: 227-47.

- Block, N. 1994. "What is Dennett's theory a theory of?" *Philosophical Topics*, 22/1-2: 23-40.
- Block, N. 1996. "Mental paint and mental latex." In E. Villanueva, ed. *Perception*. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
- Block, N. and Stalnaker, R. 1999. "Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap." *Philosophical Review*, 108/1: 1-46.
- Boyd, R. 1980. "Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail." In N. Block, ed. *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Byrne, A. 1997. "Some like it HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts." *Philosophical Studies*, 2: 103-29.
- Byrne, A. 2001. "Intentionalism defended". *Philosophical Review*, 110: 199-240.
- Campbell, K. 1970. *Body and Mind*. New York: Doubleday.
- Campbell, J. 1994. *Past, Space, and Self*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Carruthers, P. 2000. *Phenomenal Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chalmers, D. 1995. "Facing up to the problem of consciousness". *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 2: 200-19.
- Chalmers, D. 1996. *The Conscious Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, D. 2002. "Does conceivability entail possibility?" In T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne eds. *Conceivability and Possibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, D. 2003. "The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief." In A. Jokic and Q. Smith eds. *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, D. and Jackson, F. 2001. "Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation". *Philosophical Review*, 110/3: 315-60.
- Churchland, P. M. 1985. "Reduction, qualia, and direct introspection of brain states". *Journal of Philosophy*, 82: 8-28.
- Churchland, P. M. 1995. *The Engine of Reason and Seat of the Soul*. Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press.

- Churchland, P. S. 1981. "On the alleged backwards referral of experiences and its relevance to the mind body problem". *Philosophy of Science*, 48: 165-81.
- Churchland, P. S. 1983. "Consciousness: the transmutation of a concept". *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 64: 80-95.
- Churchland, P. S. 1996. "The hornswoggle problem". *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 3: 402-8.
- Clark, A. 1993. *Sensory Qualities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, G. and Riel-Salvatore, J. 2001. "Grave markers, middle and early upper paleolithic burials". *Current Anthropology*, 42/4: 481-90.
- Cleeremans, A., ed. 2003. *The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration and Dissociation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Crick, F. and Koch, C. 1990. "Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness". *Seminars in Neuroscience*, 2: 263-75.
- Crick, F. H. 1994. *The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul*. New York: Scribners.
- Davies, M. and Humphreys, G. 1993. *Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Damasio, A. 1999. *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*. New York: Harcourt.
- Dennett, D. C. 1978. *Brainstorms*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Dennett, D. C. 1984. *Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Having*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Dennett, D. C. 1990. "Quining qualia". In *Mind and Cognition*, W. Lycan, ed., Oxford : Blackwell, 519-548.
- Dennett, D. C. 1991. *Consciousness Explained*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Dennett, D. C. 1992. "The self as the center of narrative gravity". In F. Kessel, P. Cole, and D. L. Johnson, eds. *Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

- Dennett, D. C. 2003. Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking.
- Dennett, D. C. and Kinsbourne, M. 1992. "Time and the observer: the where and when of consciousness in the brain". Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15: 187-247.
- Descartes, R. 1644/1911. The Principles of Philosophy. Translated by E. Haldane and G. Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dretske, F. 1993. "Conscious experience." Mind, 102: 263-283.
- Dretske, F. 1994. "Differences that make no difference". Philosophical Topics, 22/1-2: 41-58.
- Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, Bradford Books.
- Eccles, J. and Popper, K. 1977. The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Berlin: Springer
- Edelman, G. 1989. The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books.
- Farah, M. 1990. Visual Agnosia. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Flanagan, O. 1992. Consciousness Reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Flohr, H. 1995. "An information processing theory of anesthesia". Neuropsychologia, 33/9: 1169-80.
- Flohr, H., Glade, U. and Motzko, D. 1998. "The role of the NMDA synapse in general anesthesia". Toxicology Letters, 100-101: 23-29.
- Fodor, J. 1974. "Special sciences". Synthese, 28: 77-115.
- Fodor, J. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Foster, J. 1989. "A defense of dualism". In J. Smythies and J. Beloff, eds. The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.
- Foster J. 1996. The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. London: Routledge.
- Gallistel, C. 1990. The Organization of Learning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gardiner, H. 1985. The Mind's New Science. New York: Basic Books.
- Gazzaniga, M. 1988. Mind Matters: How Mind and Brain Interact to Create our

Conscious Lives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

- Gennaro, R. 1995. Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order

Thought Theory of Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

- Gennaro, R., ed. 2004. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

- Gray, J. 1995. "The contents of consciousness: a neuropsychological conjecture". Behavior

and Brain Sciences, 18/4: 659-722.

- Hameroff, S. 1998. "Quantum computation in brain microtubules? The Penrose-Hameroff

"Orch OR" model of consciousness". Philosophical Transactions Royal Society London, A

356: 1869-96.

- Hardin, C. 1986. Color for Philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett.

- Hardin, C. 1992. "Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors". In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds. Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.

- Harman, G. 1990. "The intrinsic quality of experience". In J. Tomberlin, ed. Philosophical

Perspectives, 4. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing .

- Hartshorne, C. 1978. "Panpsychism: mind as sole reality". Ultimate Reality and Meaning,

1: 115-29.

- Hasker, W. 1999. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Heidegger, M. 1927/1962. Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). Translated by J. Macquarrie

and E. Robinson. New York: Harper and Row.

- Hellman, G. and Thompson, F. 1975. "Physicalism: ontology, determination and reduction". Journal of Philosophy, 72: 551-64.

- Hill, C. 1991. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hill, C. 1997. "Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem".

Philosophical Studies, 87: 61-85.

- Hill, C. and McLaughlin, B. 1998. "There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in

Chalmers' philosophy". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59/2: 445-54.

- Horgan, T. 1984. "Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia." Philosophical

Quarterly,
34: 147-83.

- Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. 2002. "The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality". In D. J. Chalmers , ed., *Philosophy of Mind: Classical*

and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Hume, D. 1739/1888. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. ed. L Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

- Humphreys, N. 1982. *Consciousness Regained*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Humphreys, N. 1992. *A History of the Mind*. London: Chatto and Windus.

- Husserl, E. 1913/1931. *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (Ideen au

einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie). Translated by W.

Boyce Gibson. New York: MacMillan.

- Husserl, E. 1929/1960. *Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology*. Translated by Dorian Cairns. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

- Huxley, T. 1866. *Lessons on Elementary Physiology* 8. London

- Huxley, T. 1874. "On the hypothesis that animals are automata". *Fortnightly Review*, 95:

555-80. Reprinted in *Collected Essays*. London, 1893.

- Hurley, S. 1998. *Consciousness in Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Jackson, F. 1982. "Epiphenomenal qualia". *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32: 127-136.

- Jackson, F. 1986. "What Mary didn't know". *Journal of Philosophy*, 83: 291-5.

- Jackson, F. 1993. "Armchair metaphysics". In J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael, eds.

Philosophy of Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer Books.

- Jackson, F. 1998. "Postscript on qualia". In F. Jackson *Mind, Method and Conditionals*.

London: Routledge.

- Jackson, F. 2004. "Mind and illusion." In P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa and D. Stoljar eds.

There's Something about Mary: Essays on the Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press.

- James, W. 1890. *The Principles of Psychology*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

- Jaynes, J. 1974. *The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Kim, J. 1987. "The myth of non-reductive physicalism". *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*.
- Kim, J. 1998. *Mind in Physical World*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Kant, I. 1787/1929. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by N. Kemp Smith. New York: MacMillan.
- Kinsbourne, M. 1988. "Integrated field theory of consciousness". In A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds. *Consciousness in Contemporary Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kirk, R. 1974. "Zombies vs materialists". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume*, 48: 135-52.
- Kirk, R. 1991. "Why shouldn't we be able to solve the mind-body problem?" *Analysis*, 51: 17-23.
- Kohler, W. 1929. *Gestalt Psychology*. New York: Liveright.
- Koffka, K. 1935. *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Leibniz, G. W. 1686 /1991. *Discourse on Metaphysics*. Translated by D. Garter and R. Aries. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Leibniz, G. W. 1720/1925. *The Monadology*. Translated by R. Lotte. London: Oxford University Press.
- Levine, J. 1983. "Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap". *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 64: 354-361.
- Levine, J. 1993. "On leaving out what it's like". In M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds. *Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Levine, J. 1994. "Out of the closet: a qualophile confronts qualophobia". *Philosophical Topics*, 22/1-2: 107-26.
- Levine, J. 2001. *Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Conscious Experience*. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.

- Lewis, D. 1972. "Psychophysical and theoretical identifications". Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249-58.
- Lewis, D. 1990. "What experience teaches." In W. Lycan, ed. Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Libet, B. 1982. "Subjective antedating of a sensory experience and mind-brain theories". Journal of Theoretical Biology, 114: 563-70.
- Libet, B. 1985. "Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action". Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8: 529-66.
- Llinas, R. 2001. I of the vortex: from neurons to self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
- Loar, B. 1990. "Phenomenal states," in Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 81-108.
- Loar, B. 1997. "Phenomenal states". In N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere eds. The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Locke, J. 1688/1959. An Essay on Human Understanding. New York: Dover.
- Lockwood, M. 1989. Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lorenz, K. 1977. Behind the Mirror (Ruckseite dyes Speigels). Translated by R. Taylor. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Lycan, W. 1987. Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lycan, W. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lycan, W. 2004. "The superiority of HOP to HOT". In R. Gennaro ed. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Mandler, G. 1975. Mind and Emotion. New York: Wiley.
- Marshall, I. and Zohar, D. 1990. The Quantum Self: Human Nature and Consciousness Defined by the New Physics. New York: Morrow.
- McGinn, C. 1989. "Can we solve the mind-body problem?" Mind, 98: 349-66
- McGinn, C. 1991. The Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell.
- McGinn, C. 1995. "Consciousness and space." In T. Metzinger, ed. Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945/1962. Phenomenology of Perception (Phenomenologie de l'existence humaine). Paris: Gallimard.

- Perception). Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Metzinger, T., ed. 1995. Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.
 - Metzinger, T. ed. 2000. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 - Mill, J. 1829. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. London.
 - Mill, J.S. 1865. An Analysis of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. London.
 - Moore, G. E. 1922. "The refutation of idealism." In G. E. Moore Philosophical Studies. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul.
 - Nagel, T. 1974. "What is it like to be a bat?" Philosophical Review, 83: 435-456.
 - Nagel, T. 1979. "Panpsychism." In T. Nagel Mortal Questions. Cambridge: University Press.
 - Natsoulas, T. 1983. "Concepts of consciousness." Journal of Mind and Behavior, 4: 195-232.
 - Nelkin, N. 1989. "Unconscious sensations." Philosophical Psychology, 2: 129-41.
 - Nemirow, L. 1990. "Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance." In W. Lycan, ed. Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
 - Neisser, U. 1965. Cognitive Psychology. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
 - Nida-Rumelin, M. 1995. "What Mary couldn't know: belief about phenomenal states." In T. Metzinger, ed. Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.
 - Panksepp, J. 1998. Affective Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 - Papineau, D. 1994. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
 - Papineau, D. 1995. "The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness." In T. Metzinger, ed. Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.
 - Papineau, D. 2002. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 - Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 - Pearson, M.P. 1999. The Archeology of Death and Burial. College Station, Texas: A&M Press.
 - Penfield, W. 1975. The Mystery of the Mind: a Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human Brain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Perry, J. 2001. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Penrose, R. 1989. The Emperor's New Mind: Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Penrose, R. 1994. Shadows of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Place, U. T. 1956. "Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 44-50.
- Putnam, H. 1975. "Philosophy and our mental life." In H. Putnam Mind Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, H. and Oppenheim, P. 1958. "Unity of science as a working hypothesis." In H. Fiegl, G. Maxwell, and M. Scriven eds. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rey, G. 1986. "A question about consciousness." In H. Otto and J. Tuedio, eds. Perspectives on Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Robinson, H. 1982. Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Robinson, D. 1993. "Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties." Philosophical Studies, 69: 1-34.
- Rosenberg, G. 2004. A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenthal, D. 1986. "Two concepts of consciousness." Philosophical Studies, 49: 329-59.
- Rosenthal, D. 1991. "The independence of consciousness and sensory quality." In E. Villanueva, ed. Consciousness. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.
- Rosenthal, D. M. 1993. "Thinking that one thinks." In M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds. Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Rosenthal, D. 1994. "First person operationalism and mental taxonomy." Philosophical Topics, 22/1-2: 319-50.
- Rosenthal, D. M. 1997. "A theory of consciousness." In N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G.

- Guzeldere, eds. *The Nature of Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Russell, B. 1927. *The Analysis of Matter*. London: Kegan Paul.
 - Ryle, G. 1949. *The Concept of Mind*. London: Hutchinson and Company.
 - Sacks, O. 1985. *The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat*. New York: Summit.
 - Seager, W. 1995. "Consciousness, information, and panpsychism." *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 2: 272-88.
 - Schacter, D. 1989. "On the relation between memory and consciousness: dissociable interactions and consciousness." In H. Roediger and F. Craik eds. *Varieties of Memory and Consciousness*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
 - Schneider W. and Shiffrin, R. 1977. "Controlled and automatic processing: detection, search and attention." *Psychological Review*, 84: 1-64.
 - Searle, J. R. 1990. "Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 13: 585-642.
 - Searle, J. 1992. *The Rediscovery of the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 - Siewert, C. 1998. *The Significance of Consciousness*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
 - Shallice, T. 1988. *From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 - Shear, J. 1997. *Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 - Shoemaker, S. 1975. "Functionalism and qualia," *Philosophical Studies*, 27: 291-315.
 - Shoemaker, S. 1981. "Absent qualia are impossible." *Philosophical Review*, 90: 581-99.
 - Shoemaker, S. 1982. "The inverted spectrum." *Journal of Philosophy*, 79: 357-381.
 - Shoemaker, S. 1990. "Qualities and qualia: what's in the mind," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Supplement, 50: 109-131.
 - Shoemaker, S. 1998. "Two cheers for representationalism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
 - Silberstein, M. 1998. "Emergence and the mind-body problem." *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 5: 464-82.
 - Silberstein, M 2001. "Converging on emergence: consciousness, causation and explanation." *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 8: 61-98.

- Singer, P. 1975. *Animal Liberation*. New York: Avon Books.
- Singer, W. 1999. "Neuronal synchrony: a versatile code for the definition of relations."
Neuron, 24: 49-65.
- Skinner, B. F. 1953. *Science and Human Behavior*. New York: MacMillan.
- Smart, J. 1959. "Sensations and brain processes." *Philosophical Review*, 68: 141-56.
- Stapp, H. 1993. *Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics*. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
- Stoljar, D. 2001. "Two conceptions of the physical." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62: 253-81
- Strawson, G. 1994. *Mental Reality*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, Bradford Books.
- Swinburne, R. 1986. *The Evolution of the Soul*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Titchener, E. 1901. *An Outline of Psychology*. New York: Macmillan.
- Travis, C. 2004. "The silence of the senses." *Mind*, 113: 57-94.
- Triesman, A. and Gelade, G. 1980. "A feature integration theory of attention."
Cognitive Psychology, 12: 97-136.
- Tye, M. 1995. *Ten Problems of Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Tye, M. 2000. *Consciousness, Color, and Content*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Tye, M. 2003. "Blurry images, double vision and other oddities: new troubles for representationalism?" In A. Jokic and Q. Smith eds., *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van Gulick, R. 1985. "Physicalism and the subjectivity of the mental."
Philosophical Topics, 13: 51-70.
- Van Gulick, R. 1992. "Nonreductive materialism and intertheoretical constraint."
In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, J. Kim, eds. *Emergence and Reduction*. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 157-179.
- Van Gulick, R. 1993. "Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos?"
In M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds., *Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Van Gulick, R. 1994. "Dennett, drafts and phenomenal realism." *Philosophical Topics*, 22/1-2: 443-56.

- Van Gulick, R. 1995. "What would count as explaining consciousness?" In T. Metzinger, ed. *Conscious Experience*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
- Van Gulick, R. 2000. "Inward and upward: reflection, introspection and self-awareness." *Philosophical Topics*, 28: 275-305.
- Van Gulick, R. 2003. "Maps, gaps and traps." In A. Jokic and Q. Smith eds. *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van Gulick, R. 2004. "Higher-order global states HOGS: an alternative higher-order model of consciousness." In Gennaro, R. ed. *Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- van Inwagen, P. 1983. *An Essay on Free Will*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Varela, F. and Maturana, H. 1980. *Cognition and Autopoiesis*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Varela, F. 1995. "Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem." *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 3: 330-49.
- Varela, F. and Thomson, E. 2003. "Neural synchronicity and the unity of mind: a neurophenomenological perspective." In Cleermans, A. ed. *The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Velmans, M. 1991. "Is Human information processing conscious?" *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 14/4: 651-668
- Velmans, M. 2003. "How could conscious experiences affect brains?" *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 9: 3-29.
- von Helmholtz, H. 1897/1924. *Treatise on Physiological Optics*. Translated by J. Southy. New York: Optical Society of America.
- Wilkes, K. V. 1984. "Is consciousness important?" *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 35: 223-43.
- Wilkes, K. V. 1988. "Yishi, duo, us and consciousness." In A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds., *Consciousness in Contemporary Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wilkes, K. V. 1995. "Losing consciousness." In T. Metzinger, ed. *Conscious Experience*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.